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Recently the number of Marx’s works has significantly increased on publishers’ lists in the US. Especially prominent are 
discussion of Marx as the founder of ecology. J. B. Foster’s Book Marx’s Ecology (2000) is in this respect particularly 
noteworthy. The central theses of the book are: the author’s interpretation of Marx’s so-called positivism and the explanation of 
the original anti-mechanistic and historical features of Marx’s materialism. In light of these two theses, I offer a comparison with 
my article ―Marksova koncepcija znanosti kao prirodne znanosti o čovjeku― (1969) (―Marx’s Conception of Science as Natural 
Science of Human Beings‖) and draw out significant similarities. I conclude that if we earlier missed an opportunity to base 
ecology on such foundations, we should not pass up the same opportunity after the appearance of Foster’s book. 
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John Bellamy Foster: Marxova ekologija. U zadnje vrijeme povećao se broj Marxovih djela na listama izdavača u Americi, a 
još više rasprava oko Marxa kao začetnika ekologije. Posebno se u tom smislu nameće knjiga J. B. Fostera „Marx's Ecology― 
(2000). Izlazišna teza te knjige je: autorovo gledište na tzv. Marxov pozitivizam te objašnjenje izvornog antimehanicističkog, 
historijskog obilježja Marxova materijalizma. S obzirom na te dvije teze iznosi se usporedba s mojim radom „Marksova 
koncepcija znanosti kao prirodne znanosti o čovjeku― (1969) uz konstataciju da postoji značajna sličnost. Zaključno se navodi, 
ako se u nas ranije propustilo mogućnost da se na takvom temelju razvije ekologija, onda se to ne bi trebalo desiti nakon 
pojavljivanja Fosterove knjige. 






 In the journal Green Left Weekly, in 
2009, Simon Butler [1] notes that the more 
capitalist economy was failing, the more 
attention publishers devoted to Marx’s 
works. It is clear, he adds, that the market 
cannot solve the problems of exploitation, 
war, hunger and poverty—especially when, 
as I hold, it is governed by a merciless 
struggle for profit. Other authors, besides 
Butler, turn to Marx’s recent years. The 
work of the American sociologist J. B. 
Foster is especially noteworthy in this 
respect and in particular his book Marx’s 
Ecology [2]. 
However, in reading his book and 
discovering its foundations, I cannot neglect 
an old article of mine from 1969 entitled, 
―Marksova koncepcija znanosti kao prirodne 
znanosti o čovjeku― [3] (―Marx’s 
Conception of Science as Natural Science of 
Human Beings‖). In it, I put forward and 
develop, in light of similar considerations as 
Foster, the thesis that Marx is in fact a 
pioneer of ecology. His ecology is, however, 
not anti-rationalist and idealist in 
emphasizing so-called ecological values, 
when ―real historical-material objects‖ 
disappear [2]. Foster firmly contends that 
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Marx’s ecological views emerge from his 
materialism (VIII). 
Comparing the foundations of 
Foster’s book with the aforementioned 
article, I note some striking similarities. Let 
me try to bring them out in what follows. 
Foster starts with a citation from 
Marx’s Grundrisse, and my article starts 
with two citations from Marx’s Economic 
and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. All of 
them reveal the same aim: to show what real 
historical materialism is, in contrast to a 
mechanistic-scientistic materialism and also 
in contrast to a Heideggerian negativist anti-
scientism. Another aim is to reveal Marx’s 
original interpretation of the ―metabolic 
relation‖ that is, the relationship between 
nature and humanity. This is only possible if 
beneath everything-life, nature and science-
we postulate an original materialism.  
This is why Foster puts Marx’s 
aforementioned citation at the head of his 
book: ―It is not the unity of living and active 
humanity with the natural, inorganic 
conditions of their metabolic exchange with 
nature, and hence their appreciation of 
nature, which requires explanation or is the 
result of a historic process, but rather the 
separation between these inorganic conditi-
ons of human existence and this active 
existence, a separation which is completely 
posited only in the relation of wage labor 
and capital‖ [2]. Later, in 2010, Foster and 
B. Clark argue that the ―problem of nature‖ 
is the problem of capital [4].  
In my article, the introductory 
citations show that Marx correctly discerns 
the order of nature, human relations to it, 
science and history. At the same time, he 
shows that capital is the chief culprit for the 
broken relations between nature and human 
beings. The citations are the following: ―A 
different basis for life and for science—that 
is, from the outset, a lie‖. ―Natural science 
will later equally be a science of human 
beings, just as the science of human beings 
will incorporate natural science; it will all be 
one science‖ [5].  
 
SCIENTISM AND SCIENCE 
 
a) Foster is especially concerned to show 
that Marx does not hold a positivistic 
and scientistic conception of science. 
In pursuing this goal, he shows Marx’s 
clear rejection of  earlier mechanistic 
interpretation of materialism, despite 
the fact that he remained a materialist. 
Foster also emphasizes Marx’s 
differentiation from Comte’s 
positivism—in contrast to the Frankfurt 
Marxists who are fiercely opposed to 
Marx’s alleged positivism. All this 
shows how important it is to 
understand the proper Marxist 
approach to the objects of nature and 
natural science [2]. 
To illuminate Marx’s rejection of 
mechanistic materialism, Foster seeks to 
reinterpret the 17
th
 century notion of 
―dominating nature‖ (VIII), which does not 
lead Marx to ―Prometheism,‖ that is, some 
sort of domination over nature and a 
utilitarian anthropocentrism. Rather, Marx 
recognizes the fundamental features of the 
interaction between human beings and 
nature—in the sense of, as Marx called it, 
―the metabolic relation‖ [6-7]. This gives the 
sciences a corresponding higher status—as 
Foster and Clark also emphasize in 
describing the need for establishing a social 
order [4].  
To understand this, it is necessary to 
understand Marx’s specific brand of 
materialism, which is historical materialism. 
That is why we first have to analyze the 
notion of materialism. 
b) In my article, I stress that Marx’s view 
of changing hereditary conditions 
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clearly contains a rejection of a 
scientistic understanding that sees 
science as a positive instrument in 
exploiting the world [3]. Part of this is 
overestimating the importance of the 
natural sciences at the expense of the 
so-called humanistic sciences. This is 
Comte’s positivism, which Marx 
explicitly rejects, for example in The 
Capital [3,8]. This is especially evident 
in his rejection of utilitarianism, which 
he takes to be the starting point of 
every positivism. The utilitarian 
concept of ―immediate returns‖ is an 
assumption that leads to intensified 
alienation. That is why in the Economic 
and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 
Marx devotes himself to explaining the 
sheer exploitation of nature and 
humanity [3]. According to Marx, to 
think of returns is in fact alienation [5]. 
For Marx, positive science is 
something entirely different. 
This is also evident from his equally sharp 
opposition to expressly anti-scientific views, 
which prevent science from participating in 
change. In the 20
th
 century, this is 
exemplified by ontologistic philosophy [3], 
which is nothing but a renewed idealist 
critique of science that dates back to the 19
th
 
century. According to L. Geymonat, Marx is 
expressly opposed to the latter, calling it 
―metaphysical absolutism‖ [3,9]. 
An ever increasing development of science 
[3], including the notorious natural sciences, 
which participate nonetheless in the growth 
of civilization, leads Marx to accept that 
science prepares ―human emancipation‖-
despite the fact that by introducing the 
division of labor it deepens human alienation 
[3,5]. In light of this, he adopts the view that 
the natural sciences are a fundamental 
participant in the production of life by means 
of labor. For Marx, they play the role of an 
objectual confirmation of human beings 
without which humanization and historiza-
tion of the world would be impossible [3]. 
That is why the natural sciences are the 
foundations of human science [3,5]. The 
natural sciences are a need and consequence 
of human sensory activity—which is in fact 
the emergence of nature in human history 
[3,5]. This is why he calls it historical nature 
[3,5]—and only that is real nature, 
―anthropological nature‖ [5]. As an agent of 
production, natural science humanizes 
nature; that is why it is a science of human 
beings. The object of this science—the 
natural science of human beings, that is, of 
sensory consciousness and sensory need—is 
the object of natural science of human 
beings, and nature is the object of the 
science of human beings. Positive science, 
which Marx mentions, is the science of 
human beings as products of ―practical 
human self-activity‖ [3,5]. All conflicts that 
appear between scientism and anti-science, 
natural and humanistic science, civilization 
and culture, city and village, the allegedly 
developed and the allegedly backward and 
so on, are only fictitiously eliminated by 
instituting mutually inconsis-tent norms. 
These conflicts are overcome only through 
the immediate production of life. All 
therapies beyond such production, to 
paraphrase Marx, are only the conceits of a 
consciousness which imagines that it can do 
more than is possible. It is not enough to 
have an is-oughtsensibility; a real 
affirmation of an objectual human being is 
necessary-a being which through its 
objectness sets free its natural and therefore 
human capacities [3]. The only answer lies 
in action-in universal and productive action 
which is real, that is, positive science, to the 
extent to which it bespeaks humanity. This 
means that science collaborates in bringing 
about a change in circumstances, be it in its 
alienated or in its unalienated form. And as 
long as human beings produce their lives, 
there will be a latent risk of a separation of 
their consciousness and their objectness [3]. 
Evidently, Marx firmly insists on the 
inseparability of science from the process  
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which is the relationship between human 
beings and nature. Equally unequivocally, he 
holds that there is no divide and no 
irreconcilable difference between natural and 
humanistic sciences. To repeat: natural 
science is a science of human beings, and the 
science of human beings incorporates natural 
science.  
Thus Marx speaks of a metabolic divide 
between human beings and nature which is 
deepened by capital. However he does not 
speak of a divide between the natural and the 
so-called humanistic sciences; to the 
contrary, he unites them, because he 
proceeds from a decisive materialism.  
Although there have been, on our 
intellectual scene, calls to unify all sciences, 
indeed as early as 1978 [10], Marx’s line of 
thought has been neglected under the 
influence of criticisms of Marx’s alleged 
positivism by the Frankfurt Marxists and 
also of Heidegger’s connection of science 
and metaphysics. Evidence of this influence 
can be found in a recent program on HRT 
(Croatian Radiotelevision) entitled, 
―Pogledi‖ (―Viewpoints‖) on social scientific 
and humanistic perspectives on science. The 
program discussed the Sokal affair (1996)-
the case of an American mathematician and 
physicist critical of postmodernism who 
accused it of incorrect use of scientific and 
mathematical terms. (For instance, he rightly 
criticized Julia Kristeva who, without any 
argument, claimed that poetic language 
could be understood in terms of the 
―cardinality of the continuum‖ [11]. Sokal is 
lambasted on the program-in the name of the 
humanistic sciences. In light of these 
observations, it is understandable that I now 
turn to a topic that Foster examines in great 




  a)  We can characterize Foster’s main task 
as that of showing what Marx’s materialism 
really consists in. He firsts insists on Marx’s 
transformation of mechanistic materialism 
into the Epicurean tradition in which much 
emphasis is placed on freedom [2]. Foster 
claims that Marx is really interested in 
―practical materialism‖ in a generally 
materialist conception of nature and science. 
Such practical materialism finds in its view 
of nature an important foundation for a 
conception of human freedom [1]. In 
contrast to Hegel’s idealism, Marx’s 
dialectical view of the world is contained in 
a transformation of the world and with it a 
transformation of ourselves by the 
unmasking of alienation (4-8). He thus turns 
materialism into a practical stance by tying it 
to a materialist conception of nature. That is 
why he holds that materialism is really part 
of a process of natural history (5). Hence, it 
is inseparable from the natural and physical 
sciences. 
For this reason, Foster seeks to show 
in much of his book—especially in sections 
(21-66)—the strengthening of materialism 
from Epicurus and Lucretius all the way to 
Marx. This development becomes resolute 
with the rejection of an Epicurean and 
Christian synthesis, especially prominent in 
Gassendi in the 17
th
 century (41), by the 
introduction of a materialism without God 
(46) and without teleology (48). 
Foster considers all philosophers in 
this time period who have such an 
understanding of nature and human beings, 
from Bruno in the 16
th
 century (28), Bacon 
(33,40-41,48) and Vico (47), to various 
doctors and scientists, such as Charlton, 
Boyle and Newton (42, 44). He mentions 
Hume (47), the Encyclopedists (24, 48), and 
even Kant, who, in place of Epicurean 
coincidence introduces ―necessary law.‖ Of 
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 century thinkers, he especially 
focuses on Darwin (21, 29-30) and the 
biologists Lawrence (28) and Gallo (29), and 
he mentions Hegel who in his Philosophy of 
History notes that Epicurus’s physics is the 
principle of modern physics (50). 
Unsurprisingly, he spends most of his 
time on Marx’s dissertation on Epicurus (52-
65). He emphasizes that Marx sees Epicurus 
as opposed to the determinism of 
Democritus’s physics and to teleological 
principles of religion [2,12]. That is because 
Epicurus advocates a conception of the 
possible [2]. This is very important because 
Marx comes close to a modern 
understanding of possibility that is later 
introduced by N. Abbagnano against all 
metaphysicians, including Heidegger [13].  
It is evident that we can say, with Foster, 
that Marx has internalized Epicurus’s anti-
mechanism [2,14] much more than Hegel’s 
dialectic [2]. This view is simultaneously a 
naturalism and a humanism (59) which 
emerges from Epicurus’s perception of the 
illusions of alienation [2,12]. 
However, Foster notes that Marx moves 
towards materialism even more because of 
the political and economic situation of his 
time in Germany, France and England [2].  
c) In my article from 1969, I emphasize 
that, while rejecting any form of 
teleology, Marx opposes any 
speculation about and mystification of 
consciousnesson materialist grounds 
[3,5]. His starting assumption is the 
real individual and his life process 
which can be discovered only on 
empirical grounds [3,5]. Human life is 
thus produced through labor [3]. That 
is why the world of objects and 
objectual being cannot be denied. And 
that is also why material and spiritual 
culture cannot be separated so as to 
impose the dominance of the latter. We 
need real confirmation of an objectual 
human being, and not an empty appeal 
to a bare is-ought (682). According to 
Marx, there is no humanization or 
historization of the world without a 
confirmation of the objectness of 
human beings (681). To be real agents 
of their history, human beings have to 
properly integrate the past. Otherwise 
they cannot have an appropriate vision 
of the future—which they can achieve 
only through a continual study of 
history [5], in particular the history of 
production and exchange. 
In Foster’s reading of Marx, Marx’s views 
on science and materialism form the basis of 
his views on ecology—a term that in Marx’s 
time had not even been coined yet, as was 
pointed out in 2005 [15]. Foster develops his 
reading by confronting five theses of extant 
criticisms of Marx. The criticisms are: 
 That Marx’s views don’t 
systematically cohere with the 
majority of his corpus, as argued by 
D. Goldblatt [7]. 
 That ecological views are 
inconsistent with Marx’s earlier 
critique of alienation and are less 
evident in later works. 
 That Marx misdirected his account of 
the exploitation of nature by failing 
to include it in his value theory and 
by adopting it despite his Promethean 
views, which are really pro-
technology and anti-ecology (10). 
 That on Marx’s view, capitalist 
technology and economic 
development will solve all problems, 
so that future societies will live in 
plentiful conditions and will not need 
an ecological consciousness [16]. 
 That Marx had little interest in 
questions of science or the effects of 
technology on the environment [17].  
Foster rejects all these theses and shows 
Marx’s anticipation of the significance of 
ecology. (The relevant chapters are 4. The 
Materialist Conception of History, pp. 105-
141, 5. The Metabolism of Nature and 
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Society, pp. 141-178, and 6. The Basis in 
Natural History for Our View, pp. 178-226.) 
All this could be addressed in a separate 
paper.  
I should add, however, that in my 
article from 1969, I indicated that Marx is 
concerned with problems that much later are 
thought of as ecological problems. At the 
beginning, I note that changing ―the 
hereditary conditions always and everywhere 
faces the risks of two latent alternatives: to 
either preserve the existing creatures or to 
destroy them completely. A realization of 
the first alternative would mean a complete 
failure to change the hereditary conditions, 
whereas a realization of the second 
alternative would jeopardize the survival of 
civilization itself. However, Marx holds that 
human beings seek to change the hereditary 
conditions not for its own sake but to 





In concluding, we should note again 
that on our intellectual scene, there was 
neither then, nor is there now, any interest in 
news about Marx, and so not even news 
about an ecological left. But even though we 
missed an opportunity then, it would be 
unforgivable, after Foster, to miss that 
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